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Special Comment
By FRANK S. HOWELL*
THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT AUDITOR IN
DEFENSE SUBCONTRACTING
Contract Audit in the Department of Defense
In the public interest the Department of Defense reserves a
right to audit the costs of a contract whose price is not firmly
established when the contract is entered into. This right is
implemented through standard contract clauses contained in the
Armed Services Procurement Regulation. To accomplish the
requirement thus imposed, each of the three military departments
has established a staff of contract auditors who review the cost
claims of military contractors for acceptability under contract
terms. These staffs also review and report on contractors' pro-
posals for costs to be incurred under contemplated contracts. In
both cases the audit function is advisory to procurement officials,
except that under Navy cost type contracts determination of allow-
ability of costs is made by the Navy auditor. The Department of
Defense goes beyond prime contracts for audit purposes, and
requires that when a negotiated prime contract contains an
"audit" clause the prime contractor must insert a similar clause
in each subcontract thereunder. Fixed price subcontracts in which
the price is based on adequate price competition, established
catalogs, or market prices of commercial items sold in substantial
quantities to the general public are exempt from this require-
ment.
There are various types of subcontract "audit" clauses (see
ASPR 7-104.41 and .42; 7-203.29 and .31; 7-303.28 and .29; and
0 C.P.A. (Md.), Assistant Auditor General (Contract Audits), Mr. Howell
directs the accomplishment of the contract audit mission in the Department of
the Air Force. A native of Washington, Mr. Howell attended George Washington
and American Universities in that city. Before entering Government service he
was affiliated with several investment banking houses in New York. Mr. Howell
is the author of numerous articles on varied aspects of accounting, with par-
ticular emphasis on accounting as a factor in the administration of defense
contracts.
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7-402.30 and .32) but the general concept in each is the same.
The costs of subcontractors entering into a negotiated subcontract
under a negotiated prime are subjected to audit verification,
except where there is adequate price competition or commercial
sale of the items covered by the subcontract.
Audit of subcontractor costs thus becomes an important aspect
of subcontract administration. Under the basic policies of the
Department of Defense, subcontract administration is the responsi-
bility of the prime contractor. The question at once arises as to
why there is any need for an article on the role of the Govern-
ment auditor in subcontract administration. -Reworded-why
should the contract auditors of the Department of Defense assume
from the prime contractor the audit responsibility related to
subcontract administration?
The Subcontract Audit Problem
There is a provocative aspect to this question. Military depart-
ment contract auditors auditing a negotiated subcontract under an
incentive-type prime recently uncovered serious errors in the sub-
contractor's cost statement. The subcontractor acknowledged
that his costs were overstated and agreed to a price reduction of
almost $1 million. The effect of this subcontract repricing was
to reduce costs under the incentive-type prime contract by an
equivalent amount. The prime contractor would therefore re-
ceive some $200,000 of additional profit under the 80%-20%
incentive feature of his contract, other things being equal. An
inquiry was immediately raised as to whether it was proper for
Government auditors to take action which resulted in increasing
the prime contractor's profit without any effort on his part. Again,
was it appropriate for military department auditors to act for the
prime contractor at all? This article will explain the role of the
military department auditor in accepting or questioning costs
claimed by subcontractors when.such costs form part of the total
costs of the prime contract and, hopefully, will clarify some of
the thinking which gives rise to the above questions.
Let us first dispose of the initial question. In auditing the
costs of the subcontractor, and in finding therein an overstatement
of almost $1 million, the military department auditors were acting
for the responsible administrative contracting officer and not for
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the prime contractor. The administrative contracting officer
under cost reimbursement prime contracts or other contracts
subject to repricing must pass on negotiated subcontracts proposed
for such contracts. Audit support is essential to the effective
accomplishment of this responsibility. Audits made by the prime
contractor could well be as useful as those made by Government
auditors. The fact that audit findings in the cited instance
resulted in additional profit becoming available to the prime
contractor is of secondary importance. This situation came about
only because of the type of contract used.
Under a cost reimbursement contract the audit result would
have been exactly the same but the prime contractor's profit
would not have been increased. The subcontractor's mistake was
quite obvious and should have been recognizable by any contract
cost auditor employed by the prime contractor or by the Govern-
ment. It would seem most inequitable to challenge the con-
tractor's right to additional profit on the grounds that Govern-
ment auditors rather than his own uncovered an obviously in-
correct subcontractor cost computation.
Responsibilities of the Administrative Contracting Officer
The administrative contracting officer's responsibilities with
respect to review and assent to individual subcontracts are listed
under ASPR 3-903.4. Audit assistance is normally required in
connection with his considerations under 3-904.4 (a) (v) -"Cost or
price analysis or price comparisons accomplished, with particular
attention to whether cost or pricing data are accurate, complete
and current." (Emphasis supplied.) Under ASPR 3-903.4 (b), (ii),
(iii) and (iv), which are concerned with special situations in-
cluding lack of competition, apparently unreasonable pricing,
and close prime/subcontractor -business affiliations the contracting
officer will usually require audit assistance. ASPR 3-903.4 (b) (v)
states that a careful and thorough evaluation by the contracting
officer is particularly necessary when "a subcontract is to be placed
on a cost-reimbursement, time and material, labor hour, fixed-
price incentive or fixed-price redeterminable basis." Under cur-
rent policies of the Department of Defense, audit assistance must
be provided the contracting officer on all proposed subcontracts
of this kind to exceed $250,000 ($500,000 in the case of proposed
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cost-reimbursement subcontracts.) The contracting officer may
request and receive audit assistance on proposed subcontracts of
lesser amount if he believes such assistance is desirable.
To a large extent the contracting officer's subcontract responsi-
bilities as to which audit assistance is required parallel those which
a prudent prime contractor would exercise in effectively managing
his subcontracting program. These responsibilities extend to
second-tier subcontractors and beyond. The contracting officer's
administration of a surveillance and advisory nature "should be
conducted down the subcontract chain so far as is needed to
protect Government interests." (AFPI 3.903.54)
Limits on Prime Contractors' Responsibilities
There is a school of thought which holds that every defense
prime contractor should employ a staff of subcontract auditors to
make audits required under the ASPR clauses and to assist in the
evaluation of estimates of future costs submitted by potential or
existing subcontractors. This would implement fully the philoso-
phy that subcontract administration is the responsibility of the
prime contractor. Some well-known companies in the defense
industry do indeed employ audit staffs for this purpose and little
fault can be found with the results of their efforts. Even in
these cases, however, there are obstacles to complete implementa-
tion of the basic philosophy. One problem that comes readily to
mind is the audit of cost reimbursement subcontracts under a
cost reimbursement prime. The peculiar nature of cost reim-
bursement contracts, and subcontracts thereunder, long ago cre-
ated considerable uncertainty as to a cost reimbursement prime
contractor's responsibilities with respect to its subcontractor's
cost reimbursement vouchers. Many people will argue that the
Government's responsibility for control over appropriated funds
extends to the last link in a cost reimbursement prime-subcon-
tracting chain. U.S.C. Title 10, Sec. 2313 (a) (2) entitles Govern-
ment agencies to audit cost reimbursement subcontract costs.
Section 2276 imposes penalties on attempts to deprive the Govern-
ment of the benefits of a "full and free audit" by the designee of
the head of an executive department. Whatever the arguments
under the Code may be it is now a matter of long standing
practice for the military departments to audit the costs of cost
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reimbursement subcontractors under a cost reimbursement prime.
Even those companies who maintain their own staffs for the audit
of subcontracts are willing to have the Government audit the
costs of their cost reimbursement subcontractors. Rarely, if ever,
are claims of this nature audited by other than Government
auditors.
Avoidance of Duplicate Effort
In accomplishing the previously noted parallel responsibilities
of the administrative contracting officer and the prime contractor
in the administration of subcontracts, avoidance of unnecessary
duplication of audit effort becomes a prime objective of both. In
particular situations, therefore, the use of information supplied
by Government audit personnel is encouraged even for those
prime contractors who maintain their own contract audit staffs.
Air Force Procurement Instructions cover these situations in more
detail (AFPI 54.206) than do Army and Navy instructions. For
example, where a subcontractor holding prime or subcontracts
from military department sources and regularly audited by one
of the military departments is visited by a prime contractor
auditor, there will be, with even the closest possible coordination
between military department auditors and those of the prime
contractor, a costly duplication of effort which must be paid for
by the taxpayer, who receives little or nothing in return. The
obvious means of preventing such duplication is for the cognizant
military department auditor to make the needed audit, the results
of which will be made available, in whole or in part to the prime
contractor.
The defense industry is tightly knit and its top companies are
highly specialized. The knowledge and abilities of any one com-
pany in the industry may be required in varying degree under
differing programs. In some programs it may act as prime con-
tractor and program manager, with companies of equal size and
importance among its subcontractors. In other programs it may
be a subcontractor to primes who are its own subcontractors on
different programs. There is a constant interplay of costs and
know-how within the industry. Any attempt to implement fully
the concept that each prime contractor is responsible for accom-
plishing the requirements of the audit clauses which it must
insert in its subcontracts would mean that auditors of company
19641
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"A" might be examining the cost records of company "B" under
one program while simultaneously the auditors of "B" would be
examining the records of "A" in connection with another. And
consider the plight of company "C" which might be subcontractor
to both. Auditors of both "A" and "B" could very well be in its
plant at the same time struggling manfully to accomplish simul-
taneous audits of "C's" overhead accounts. In the case of com-
ponent manufacturers it does not take too much imagination to
visualize auditors from half a dozen primes in its plant at the
same time.
The above considerations are in no sense exaggerated. The
Department of the Air Force has audit responsibility for one well-
known component manufacturer who must deal with more than
100 separate administrative contracting officers under dozens of
different programs. If each prime for whom this manufacturer
acts as a subcontractor were to send out its own auditors another
building would probably have to be constructed by the subcon-
tractor to contain them all.
The audit cognizance program of the Department of Defense
recognizes the problems its contractors would encounter if they
were forced to deal separately with auditors of each military
service-and there are only three. Each major contractor plant in
the defense industry has been assigned to one or another of the
three services for contract audit purposes. The auditor responsi-
ble for this plant makes all audits required by the individual
services. In accomplishing audits for other services, the responsible
plant auditor is governed by the requirements of the service
whose contract he is auditing. This is not a particularly difficult
task since the audit requirements of the three services are closely
parallel with constant efforts being made to eliminate any dif-
ferences. The audit cognizance program has been extended to
cover the requirements of Government agencies outside the
Department of Defense so that military department auditors will
upon request conduct audits for other Government agencies doing
business with the contractor.
The system outlined above has proven readily adaptable to
the audit of subcontracts being accomplished by the company for
whom the service auditor has Government audit responsibility.
The economic benefits of having one set of contract auditors and
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one alone making audit determinations for all contracts and
subcontracts held by the defense contractor are easily recognized.
There is a tremendous cost savings. Auditors employed by prime
contractors to audit the costs of their subcontractors would incur
salary and travel costs which would be recognizable as part of the
overhead under their Government contracts. The costs of recruit-
ing and training one hundred or more prime contractor contract
audit staffs stagger the imagination. There would be no offsetting
savings to the Government through reduction of its audit efforts
since it would still be required to maintain auditors in the
contractor's plants to audit the company's prime contracts and any
cost reimbursement subcontracts under the cost reimbursement
primes of other contractors.
Consistency in Audit Findings
The audit coordination program of the Department of Defense
differs from the audit cognizance program in that it is directed
toward assurance that a contractor's accounts will receive con-
sistent audit treatment from the auditors who are cognizant of
the company's various plants. This is by no means a simple task.
To a degree seldom appreciated by outsiders audit is a judgmental
process. Even the expansion of ASPR Section XV to encyclopaedic
proportions could not make it otherwise. The problem is com-
pounded by the inability of the accounting profession to agree
on much more than certain common text book fundamentals of
which few indeed extend to the problems of cost allocation. But
the defense subcontractor is entitled to common audit treatment
of his accounts in each plant, as long as the end result is con-
sistently accumulated and is reasonable. The introduction into
his plants of prime contractor auditors who may disagree violently
with concepts previously accepted by the military department
auditors, or vice versa, can completely upset the objectives of the
DOD audit coordination program. Prime contractors who view
with articulate disfavor the use of ASPR Section XV cost reim-
bursement principles as a guide for determining the costs of other
types of contracts can hardly be expected to enforce such prin-
ciples upon their subcontractors. In light of these considerations,
the use of prime contractor auditors in subcontractor plants which
are under the audit coordination program is not encouraged. The
1964]
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same considerations govern, albeit less rigidly, the use of prime
contractor auditors in the plants of subcontractors who have been
informally coordinated by the military services.
Other Factors
There are other situations in which the use of Government
auditors instead of those of the prime contractor for the audits of
subcontractors is desirable. Some subcontractors will not permit
prime contractor access to their records. They fear to have
potential or actual competitors gain knowledge of their business
through the close analysis of accounts and management decisions
which is a requisite of effective contract auditing. In such in-
stances the only answer is for the Government to make the audit
required by the administrative contracting officer, with use of the
Government audit report by the prime contractor.
There is a reverse side to this particular coin. A suprisingly
large number of defense contractors do not wish to audit their
subcontractors, or to receive through Government audit any infor-
mation beyond that normally available through public sources, on
the grounds that receipt of such information would make them
vulnerable under the antitrust laws. The author must leave
debate on this problem to those better versed in legal concepts
than himself.
Military department auditors reviewing the costs of a subcon-
tractor may encounter situations in which the subcontractor fears
that the prime will obtain through the Government audit report
trade secrets or other information which the subcontractor wishes
to hold confidential, so far as the prime is concerned. In such
instances it is customary for the Government auditor to designate
in his report to the contracting officer those items which are to be
held in confidence. In extreme cases, and particularly where it is
understood that the audit report will be used as a negotiating
vehicle by the prime contractor, confidential information relating
to the subcontractor can be at his request physically separated
from the remainder of the audit report. If, however, the auditor
takes exception to costs whose supporting data are considered
confidential by the subcontractor, a vexing situation develops.
Fortunately these have been few in number and all have been
resolved on a case-by-case basis.
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The use of interdivisional work orders or orders between
parent and affiliate or parent and subsidiary is a common practice
in the defense industry. So far as the contracting officer is con-
cerned, orders of this kind have most of the characteristics of sub-
contracts, and audit is required wherever it would be needed in
the case of recognized subcontracts, perhaps more often and in
greater depth than would be the case if prime and sub were at
arms length. In these situations it is clearly in the public interest
that audit of "subcontract" costs be made by Government per-
sonnel.
Similar considerations but in lesser degree are governing in
those cases where the prime contractor subcontracts all, or a sub-
stantial portion of his prime contract to one or to a very limited
number of subcontractors. Contractor utilization of Government
audit information is obviously to the mutual interest of the prime
contractor and the 'public, and is often the only practicable
method of obtaining essential information.
Coordination of Prime and Military Auditors
Prime contractors may request Government audit service in
connection with the pricing of their subcontracts. Such requests
are addressed to the administrative contracting officer cognizant
of the prime, who is authorized to accept or reject them. Prime
contractor requests for Government audit service will normally
specify those areas of the subcontractor's pricing proposal as to
which audit information is desired, and the uses to which the
data furnished by the auditor will be directed. Neither the prime
contractor nor the contracting officer may impose any limitation
upon the scope of the audit.
Over the years the contract audit organizations of the military
departments have accumulated a vast body of knowledge con-
cerning the accounting and cost estimating practices of the com-
panies which compose the defense industry. A prime contractor
contemplating a cost reimbursement, fixed-price incentive, fixed-
price redeterminable or other subcontract listed under ASPR
3-903.4 (b) (v) may consult with appropriate military department
audit personnel as to the adequacy of the prospective subcon-
tractor's accounting system whenever an appraisal of that system
has previously been performed by the Government. If the prime
1964]
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contractor maintains his own contract audit staff, his auditors are
privileged to consult with the military department auditors
cognizant of the prospective subcontractor in order to avoid so
far as is possible, an unnecessary duplication of audit effort.
The Government reserves the right to "audit the auditors"
of the prime contractors in cases involving the cost representations
of subcontractors. This review is normally accomplished on a
selective basis, first to make sure that reports and recommenda-
tions of the prime contractor's auditors are consistent with Depart-
ment of Defense procurement policies and second to assure that
they also are consistent with the approved policies of the prime
contractor.
Government audit reviews of prime contractors' audits of their
subs are normally accomplished through a critical appraisal of the
prime's audit reports, with reference to working papers as needed.
It has rarely been necessary to request or to make a reaudit of the
subcontractors' records.
Reviews of Subcontractors' Cost Forecasts
The prospective subcontractor, before entering into price
negotiations with the prime will, or should, submit evidence of
the reasonableness of his proposed price. If no price comparisons
are available, such evidence will most often consist of a statement
of anticipated costs under the contemplated subcontract. A state-
ment of forecasted costs, even if supported by narrative explana-
tions, is seldom convincing in itself, particularly to the administra-
tive contracting officer, who normally will be unwilling to assent
to a proposed subcontract price without the assurance provided
by informed analysis of the subcontractor's proposal. The certifica-
tion required under PL 653, 87th Congress, may lead subcon-
tractors to be more exacting in preparing their proposals, but it
provides no substitute for effective analysis. Such analysis as a
minimum looks carefully at the anticipated direct costs, the fore-
casted overhead, expected tooling costs, and other factors, seeking
to determine if they provide, in reasonable amounts and relation-
ships with one another, a generally reliable estimate of what it
will cost to perform the proposed subcontract.
Evaluations of subcontractor price proposals postulated on the
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potential subcontractor's anticipated cost of performance are
foreign to most prime contractors, who are more accustomed to
defending their own proposals than to analyzing the proposals of
other firms. American industry has customarily relied on its skill
in comparing prices, item by item, to achieve the best buy, and
the purchasing departments of most defense contractors tend to
follow this practice in dealings with their subcontractors. In
contrast, the Government is accustomed to evaluating proposed
prices on a "cost to make" basis, a situation into which it has
largely been forced by its pressing need to procure items which
have not been previously manufactured, and in which price
competition simply does not exist. Government reliance on audit
review of proposed subcontractor costs as an aid to this process is
a natural consequence. As in the case of incurred cost audits, some
prime contractors maintain their own staffs to make such evalua-
tions.
Neither Government contract auditors nor those of the prime
contractors are endowed with the gift of prophecy when it comes
to the costs of future subcontracts. But Government auditors who
have been auditing the costs of a prospective subcontractor on a
regular basis can put their acquired knowledge of the subcon-
tractors' operations, including his accounting system and his cost
estimating methods, to good use in appraising the reasonableness
of proposed factors and relationships entering into the subcon-
tractor's cost estimate. If the subcontractor has had previous
experience in producing the items covered by his proposal the
auditor can usually proffer informed comment on quantitative
estimates of labor hours and material requirements, but otherwise
comments of this kind are best left to engineers. In review and
analysis of subcontractor proposals the Government contract
auditor will usually function as one member of a team reviewing
the whole proposal.
Contract auditors are increasingly being called upon to review
subcontractors' methods of forecasting fund requirements under
major defense programs. Considerations previously discussed in
this article apply with equal force here, the sole exception being
that audit emphasis is directed more toward appraising the
reasonableness of fund forecasting methods than toward the
reliability of the forecast itself.
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After the Audit
The Government auditor reviewing a subcontractor's claim of
costs incurred or an estimate of costs to be incurred will normally
discuss his findings with the subcontractor to assure that he has
properly understood all of the elements that make up the sub-
contractor's proposal, with particular emphasis on that portion of
the supporting material which is to be held in confidence. The
subcontractor will not receive a copy of the auditor's report. The
Government auditor upon request will atend prenegotiation fact-
finding sessions between the prime and subcontractor and may
attend meetings held to negotiate the actual subcontract.
Where evaluations of proposed subcontract costs have been
made by the prime contractor's auditors or cost analysts, the
Government auditor may review the work of the prime's staff on
a selective basis as part of his regular audit effort, or in connection
with the pricing of individual subcontracts.
Summary
Strict application of the basic Department of Defense sub-
contracting philosophy would require that the contract audit
needs of the responsible administrative contracting officer be met
through contract audit reports issued by the staff of the price
contractor. Practical considerations, the most important of which
is the cost of compounded duplicative effort, have dictated a
reverse situation in which the contract audit needs of the prime
contractor in respect to the costs of his subcontractors are fre-
quently met through Government audit reports prepared for
the administrative contracting officer and released by him to the
prime. This procedure has been operating satisfactorily and the
problems surrounding its application have been satisfactorily
resolved.
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